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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
DEFAMATION
Jessica R. Friedman
Because electronic communications networks like the Internet
make it possible to "libel [someone] instantly in front of one and a
half million people, 5 4° it is inevitable that the law of defamation will
play a prominent role on the information superhighway.54' Part I of
this section of the Report will outline some of the basic principles of
the law of defamation. Part II will discuss the liability of online ser-
vice providers for defamatory statements that are transmitted over
their networks. Part III will consider other questions which may arise
from the application of existing defamation principles and precedents
to modern technologies.
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DEFAMATION
A defamatory statement is a false statement of fact about a living
person, corporate entity, or other business unit that tends to injure his
or its reputation or the esteem, respect, or goodwill in which the sub-
ject is held by a substantial and respectable group of people.542 To
recover damages for defamation, a plaintiff must plead and prove (1)
the publication of a statement of fact which (2) was false and defama-
tory, (3) reasonably referred to the plaintiff, (4) was made with the
requisite degree of fault, and (5) caused actual injury to the plain-
tiff.543 A statement reasonably refers to the plaintiff if, from the state-
ment, the plaintiff is identifiable to even a small group of people.544
540. Peter H. Lewis, Libel Suit Against Prodigy Tests On-Line Speech Limits, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 16, 1994, at D1 (quoting Jacob H. Zamansky).
541. Defamation encompasses libel (written or printed statements) and slander
(oral statements). 1 Slade R. Metcalf & Leonard M. Niehoff, Rights and Responsibili-
ties of Publishers, Broadcasters and Reporters § 1.01, at 1-4 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
542. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1976); see generally 1 Metcalf &
Niehoff, supra note 541, §§ 1.10-1.14 (discussing what constitutes defamatory matter).
Certain kinds of statements whose harmful effect is clear from the words them-
selves are considered defamatory per se. Statements which allege one or more of the
following have traditionally been held to constitute libel or slander per se: (1) the
plaintiff's commission of a criminal offense; (2) that the plaintiff has a "loathsome
disease"; (3) that the plaintiff lacks integrity or is not qualified for his or her trade,
business, or profession; and (4) a female plaintiff's unchastity. See 1 Metcalf &
Niehoff, supra note 541, § 1.11.
543. 1 Metcalf & Niehoff, supra note 541, § 1.01, at 1-6 (citing Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 558 (1976)); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199-200 (1979). The ele-
ments of a defamation cause of action vary slightly from state to state. See, e.g.,
Bickling v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (D. Del. 1994) (including
"understanding of the defamatory nature of the communication by the third party" as
an element of a cause of action for defamation).
544. See Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin, 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966) ("It is suffi-
cient if those who knew the plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant.");
Keeton et al., supra note 212, at 773-74.
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At least where the defendant is a member of the media, a defama-
tion plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted with some
degree of fault in order to recover damages. s5 The requisite level of
fault necessary to establish a cause of action depends on the plaintiff's
status. If the plaintiff is a "public official,"" "public figure," 7 or
"limited purpose public figure," 5  he must prove, by "clear and con-
vincing evidence," 9 that the defendant published the statement at
issue with "actual malice. '550 Actual malice, which is sometimes re-
ferred to as "constitutional malice" to distinguish it from common law
malice,"5' is knowledge that a statement is false or a reckless disregard
for whether the statement is true or false.55 A plaintiff who is a pri-
vate person must satisfy a lesser standard to recover damages in a
defamation action. 53 In most states, a private plaintiff must show
545. 1 Metcalf & Niehoff, supra note 541, § 1.17, at 1-51.
546. The basis for the "public official" distinction is the United States Supreme
Court's decision in New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This cate-
gory of defamation plaintiffs casts a wide net. In fact, "judges appear to characterize
anyone who is a government employee with a modicum of responsibility as a public
official." 1 Metcalf & Niehoff, supra note 541, § 1.50, at 1-109.
547. The Supreme Court first extended the "public official" distinction to encom-
pass "public figures" in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker,
which were argued together and are both reported at 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Although
initially it appeared that Butts and Walker would result in a higher standard of fault
for public figures than for public officials, the view that the two classes of plaintiffs
should be held to the same standard later prevailed. 1 Metcalf & Niehoff, supra note
541, at § 1.26.
548. "Limited purpose public figures," also known as "vortex public figures," are
people who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Gertz v. Robert Welch.
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). Determining whether a plaintiff is a limited purpose
public figure requires a resolution of (1) whether a public controversy exists, (2) the
nature and extent of the plaintiff's role in the controversy, and (3) whether the al-
leged defamation was germane to the plaintiff's participation .in the controversy.
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc. 627 F.2d 1287, 1296-98 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
549. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 329 n.2.
550. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991); Foretich v.
Capital CitiesIABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1551 (4th Cir. 1994). Two rationales underlie
the imposition of a heavier burden on public figure plaintiffs. First, such plaintiffs
generally have greater access to the media and thus are in a better position to correct
any alleged defamation by publicizing their own versions of the events at issue. Id. at
1552. Second, public figures are less deserving of protection from defamation because
they "have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury" from defama-
tory statements. Il
551. See 1 Metcalf & Niehoff, supra note 541, § 1.67.
552. Masson, 501 U.S. at 510. A defendant has a reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of a statement if prior to making the statement he "entertained serious doubts
as to [its] truth" or had a "high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity." Harris v.
Quadracci, 48 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995) (alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
553. In Gertz, the Supreme Court held that "so long as [the States] do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a pri-
vate individual." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
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only that the defendant acted negligently in publishing the defamatory
statement. 4
Ordinarily, the same liability attaches to the republication of an ac-
tionable defamatory statement as attaches to the original publication
of the statement.555 To establish liability for a republication, however,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that in distributing the publication at
issue, the defendant had "knowledge of the contents of [the] publica-
tion. '556 Thus, publishers such as newspapers, magazines, and broad-
casters are liable for defamatory statements contained in their
publications to the same extent as the originators of such statements,
because they have editorial control over the material that they pub-
lish.557 But distributors such as bookstores, libraries, and news deal-
ers, who have no responsibility for, and usually no knowledge of, the
contents of the material they distribute are liable for the republication
of defamatory material only if they knew or had reason to know of its
defamatory character. Common carriers such as telephone compa-
nies, who simply deliver material to its destination, are permitted to
deliver without liability even statements that they know to be defama-
tory, unless they know or have reason to know that the sender of the
statements cannot claim a privilege in transmitting the statements.559
At the bottom of the ladder are those who merely supply communica-
tions equipment; these suppliers are never liable for defamatory state-
ments transmitted through or with the equipment they supply.560
II. LIABILITY OF ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS
One of the most pressing issues concerning defamation and digital
communication is what standard of liability the courts should apply to
online information service providers561 named as defendants in cases
554. See Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1552; 1 Metcalf & Niehoff, supra note 541, § 1.66, at 1-
148; see also id. § 1.17 (discussing degree of fault that private plaintiffs must show in
defamation suits against media defendants).
555. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581 (1976).
556. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see
also Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (holding
that the power to censor a broadcast is not enough because applying such a standard
would force unrealistic monitoring duties on all of an affiliate's local stations).
557. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581(1) crts. c & g (1976).
558. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 727, 729 (D. Wyo. 1986);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581(1) cmts. d & e (1976); Loftus E. Becker, Jr., The
Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for Defamation Posted by Others, 22
Conn. L. Rev. 203, 215 (1989).
559. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 612(2) (1976).
560. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581(1) cmt. b (1976); Becker, supra note
558, at 215.
561. There are many different categories of digital information service providers, or
"online service providers." These categories include the following: (1) individuals
who run electronic bulletin boards from their personal computers; (2) companies that
provide particular database systems, such as LEXIS or WESTLAW; (3) "Internet ac-
cess providers," such as NETCOM, which offer access to the Internet (and the World
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that involve allegedly defamatory statements transmitted over their
networks.5 62 Should the courts classify online service providers as
publishers, distributors, or common carriers?
Only two cases have addressed this question. In Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe Inc. ,563 the plaintiff claimed that CompuServe was liable
for defamatory statements contained in a newsletter that was available
on CompuServe's Journalism Forum.56 Cameron Communications,
Inc. ("CCI"), an independent company, controlled the contents of the
forum, and an outside publisher supplied the newsletter to CCI 5
CompuServe had no opportunity to review the contents of the news-
letter before the outside publisher uploaded it to the forum and CCI
made the newsletter available to subscribers5 66 Finding that Com-
puServe had little or no editorial control over statements transmitted
on its system,5 67 the court classified CompuServe as a distributor. 6s
Accordingly, the court held that CompuServe could not be held liable
for the statements in the newsletter unless it knew or had reason to
know that the statements were defamatory.5 69 Concluding that Com-
puServe had no such knowledge, the court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the online service provider. 70 In reaching its
decision, the court stated that the imposition of a higher standard of
liability for online service providers "would impose an undue burden
on the free flow of information."' 71
In Stratton Oalnont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,57 however, Prod-
igy was held to be a publisher rather than a distributor of defamatory
Wide Web) and electronic mail for fixed fees; and (4) comprehensive service provid-
ers such as America Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe that provide databases, bulle-
tin boards, electronic mail, and Internet access in a single subscriber package.
562. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Becker, supra note 558; Robert
Charles, Note, Computer Bulletin Boards and Defamation: Who Should Be Liable?
Under What Standard?, 2 J.L. & Tech. 121 (1987). The inquiry here is whether online
service providers should be liable for defamatory statements originated by users, not
whether liability should attach for statements that the providers themselves originate.
563. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
564. Id. at 138. A "forum" is "comprised of electronic bulletin boards, interactive
online conferences, and topical databases." Id. at 137.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id at 140. The court stated that:
While CompuServe may decline to carry a given publication altogether, in
reality, once it does decide to carry a publication, it will have little or no
editorial control over that publication's contents. This is especially so when
CompuServe carries the publication as part of a forum that is managed by a
company unrelated to CompuServe.
Id.
568. Id. at 140; see also Stem v. Delphi Internet Servs. Corp., 626 N.Y.S2d 694, 697
(Sup. Ct. 1995) (classifying computer bulletin boards as distributors in the context of a
right of publicity claim under N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (McKinney 1992)).
569. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
570. Id at 141.
571. Id. at 140.
572. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. CL May 24, 1995).
1995]
798 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
statements posted on Prodigy's "Money Talk" bulletin board. 7 The
court based its holding on the fact that Prodigy held itself out as exer-
cising editorial control over its network and did in fact exercise such
control574 by (1) promulgating content guidelines that instructs users
to refrain from posting certain types of messages,575 (2) using software
designed to automatically prescreen all bulletin board postings for of-
fensive language,576 (3) employing "Board Leaders" to monitor the
bulletin boards, and (4) using an "emergency delete function" that
permits Board Leaders automatically to delete undesirable
messages. 77 The court concluded that by using these techniques,
Prodigy had taken a role analogous to the role of a newspaper or tele-
vision network 578 and could be held liable accordingly.579
573. Id. at *4. Money Talk is a popular bulletin board upon which subscribers "can
post statements regarding stocks, investments and other financial matters." Id. at *1.
The statements at issue claimed that the plaintiffs, a securities investment banking
firm and its president, had committed acts amounting to criminal securities fraud. Id.
For example, one posting asserted that the investment firm was a "'cult of brokers
who either lie for a living or get fired.'" Id. The suit also named David Lusby, the
Prodigy subscriber from whose account the messages were posted. See Peter H.
Lewis, A New Twist in an On-Line Libel Case, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 19, 1994, at D10
[hereinafter Lewis, A New Twist]. Mr. Lusby was able to show that his account was
inactive and therefore whoever had posted the allegedly defamatory statements had
used his account without authorization. See Peter H. Lewis, Libel Suit Against Prod-
igy Tests On-Line Speech Limits, N.Y. Tunes, Nov. 16, 1994, at D1. Stratton Oakmont
dropped its claims against Mr. Lusby and Prodigy agreed to track down the user who
had posted the messages. Id. at D2; Lewis, A New Twist, supra, at D10.
574. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4. The court found that Prodigy had
asserted the right to review and edit material placed on its network that was "harmful
to other members, to merchants or information providers, or to the service or the
business interests of Prodigy." Robert B. Charles, Computer Libel Questions in 'Strat-
ton v. Prodigy', N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 1994, at 1, 4 (quoting Prodigy online warning). The
court also noted that Prodigy had advertised and defended its monitoring policies.
Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *2; see Lewis, A New Twist, supra note 573, at
D10.
575. Prodigy discourages the posting of "insulting" messages and warns users that
"[messages] that harass other members or are deemed to be in bad taste or grossly
repugnant to community standards, or are deemed harmful to maintaining a harmoni-
ous online community, w[ould] be removed when brought to PRODIGY's attention."
Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *2.
576. Prodigy calls this software "George Carlin software," referring to the come-
dian who performs a monologue, entitled "Seven Dirty Words," about censorship in
broadcasting. Peter H. Lewis, No More 'Anything Goes': Cyberspace Gets Censors,
N.Y. Times, June 29, 1994, at Al. Prodigy's own list of offensive words "has grown
into the dozens." Id.
577. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *2-*3.
578. See id. at *5 (noting that Prodigy had "virtually created an editorial staff of
Board Leaders [with] the ability to continually monitor incoming transmissions").
The Stratton Oakmont court indicated that it did not intend its holding to deter
online service providers from implementing policies similar to Prodigy's so long as
there is a market for such controlled service. See id. at *5.
579. The court also found that the "Board Leader" responsible for monitoring the
bulletin board upon which the defamatory statements were posted was Prodigy's
agent for purposes of the plaintiff's claims. ld. at *7.
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The Stratton Oakmont decision, which is pending rehearing,5s°
would seem to impose a stricter standard on online service providers
than the standard imposed by the common law. The decision imposes
liability not just for actual or constructive knowledge of the specific
contents of bulletin board postings, which the court did not attribute
to Prodigy, but also for the "mere right to make editorial
judgments.58 1
Online service providers assert that because users transmit "trillions
of bits of data" on online networks during the course of a single
day,582 it is virtually impossible to monitor networks for defamatory
statements. Bulletin board operators or monitors can attempt to lo-
cate and remove defamatory statements through random spot checks.
But such a system will not necessarily discover all or even any poten-
tially defamatory statements. Some statements are defamatory only
in context, and the context that makes a particular statement defama-
tory could be a message that was posted, and removed, long before
the execution of a spot check. In addition, monitoring by network
operators would severely reduce the speed of communication and
real-time interaction that attract people to online networks.5s 3 Online
service providers also argue that policing their systems would increase
580. As of this writing, the parties in Stratton Oakmont had settled and the plain-
tiffs had dropped the suit. See Jared Sandberg, Securities Company That Had Sued
Prodigy Services for Libel Drops Suit, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1995, at B7. Prodigy, how-
ever, was still seeking to overturn the decision on reargument and the plaintiffs did
not intend to oppose Prodigy's efforts. Matthew Goldstein, Parties Seek End to On-
Line Defamation Lawsuit, N.Y. LI., Oct. 25, 1995, at 1, 1. The general counsel to one
of the major online service providers has stated that "the Stratton Oakmont decision
[is] ... likely to be short-lived." Kent D. Stuckey, Rights and Responsibilities of Infor-
mation Service Providers, in Business and Legal Aspects of the Internet and Online
Services 203, 220 (1995).
581. Stuckey, supra note 580, at 219. Specifically, the court found that:
The key distinction between CompuServe [in the Cubby case] and PROD-
IGY is two fold [sic]. First, PRODIGY held itself out to the public and its
members as controlling the content of its computer bulletin boards. Second,
PRODIGY implemented this control through its automatic software screen-
ing program, and the Guidelines which Board Leaders are required to
enforce.
Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
It is arguable that an online service provider could preclude being classified as a
publisher by informing subscribers that it has no obligation to remove offensive
messages. The Stratton Oakmont decision, however, indicates that such a disclaimer
will not enable an online service provider to avoid liability if the provider takes actual
steps to censor material transmitted on its network. See id. at *5. It appears that
courts will classify online service providers as distributors only if they do not take any
such steps.
582. See Comments of Online Service Providers on a Preliminary Draft of the Re-
port of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights 12 (Sept. 7, 1994) (on file
with author). These comments were made for the purpose of urging a new standard
of liability for online service providers in the context of copyright infringement, see
id., but the points concerning the service providers' ability to monitor information
apply with equal force to the issue of liability for defamatory statements.
583. Id. at 19.
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the cost of providing online services, and that they would be forced to
pass these increased costs on to consumers.5 4 One response to this
argument is that online service providers are compensated for in-
creased expense and exposure by the attraction of consumers who,
except for the existence of monitoring systems, would not join the
network.585
Not all online service providers exercise the same level of editorial
control as Prodigy, so not all necessarily would be considered publish-
ers. If, however, the Stratton Oakmont decision survives rehearing
and remains law, it may force online service providers to choose be-
tween risking publisher status by exercising some level of editorial
oversight, and completely abdicating editorial control of their net-
works to avoid being vulnerable to the payment of large damage
awards in libel suits. 586
III. OTHER DEFAMATION ISSUES ON THE INFORMATION
SUPERHIGHWAY
The availability of online technology and the nature of some online
communications may result in certain online plaintiffs' being treated
as public figures. One of the rationales for requiring a higher standard
of proof from public officials and public figures is that such people
generally enjoy superior access to the media and thus are better posi-
tioned than private people to rebut or reply to offensive statements.587
584. Id.
585. The Stratton Oakmont court stated, "For the record, the fear that this Court's
finding of publisher status for PRODIGY will compel all computer networks to abdi-
cate control of their bulletin boards, incorrectly presumes that the market will refuse
to compensate a network for its increased control and the resulting increased expo-
sure." Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
586. From a business point of view, the latter is hardly a viable option because it
puts the online service provider at risk of being "blindsided not only by litigation, but
by consumer dissatisfaction" with the nature or quality of material appearing on its
network. Jessica R. Friedman, Libel in Cyberspace, Folio: The Magazine for Maga-
zine Management, Sept. 1, 1995, at 57, 58. This dilemma may be compounded by the
Communications Decency Act of 1995, H.R. 1004, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S.
314, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), and the Protection of Children from Computer
Pornography Act of 1995, H.R. 2104, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 892, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), which would make it a crime to transmit pornography over the
Internet, but which would allow as a defense a showing that certain efforts were made
to restrict such transmissions. See H.R. 1004, § 2, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 314,
§ 2, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a
discussion of the impact of this legislation on the duty of online service providers after
Stratton Oakmont, see Defamation Online: Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy, Multimedia
Strategist (Editors' Roundtable), Sept. 1995, at S-1, S-3 to S-4 [hereinafter Defama-
tion Online].
An encouraging development, perhaps, is the plaintiffs' strategy in Bowker v.
America Online Inc., in which the plaintiffs are not immediately seeking recovery
from the online service provider, but "have filed a petition for discovery, asking the
court to force [America Online] to reveal the name of the subscriber that published
the allegedly defamatory statement." Defamation Online, supra, at S-4.
587. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
[Vol. 64
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A subscriber to an online service or someone with an Internet account
has the ability to send a rebuttal easily and quickly to thousands if not
millions of people 88 without having to go through an intermediary
such as a newspaper editor.58 9 Should such a person be deemed to
have "access to the media" sufficient to qualify as a public figure?590
This question is deceptive because "not all users of [the] Internet and
other on-line services have access to all news groups or bulletin
boards."591 A person could be defamed on a bulletin board or in a
news group to which he or she does not subscribe or, in other words,
defamed in a forum to which he would not necessarily have
"access." 592
Another question that may arise in the context of online defama-
tion is whether one who participates in an online debate is a "limited
purpose public figure." 593 As noted above, the first step in deciding
whether a defamation plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure is to
ascertain whether the plaintiff was involved in a "public controversy"
when he was allegedly defamed. 591 What constitutes a "public" con-
troversy in an environment where millions of people debate each
other continuously on a wide variety of controversial subjects?595 One
way to answer this question is to consider the number of users that
participated in the online discussion in which the defendant made the
allegedly defamatory statements, or, in the context of online news ar-
ticles, how many people called up the story which contained the state-
588. See Thomas D. Brooks, Note, Catdzing Jellyfish in the Internet: The Public-
Figure Doctrine and Defamation on Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 Rutgers Computer
& Tech. LJ. 461, 479-83 (1995).
589. Id. at 482.
590. The question assumes that online communications constitute "media" in the
traditional sense.
591. Brooks, supra note 588, at 480.
592. See id. One could easily obtain access to the forum in which he was libeled by
paying a small subscription fee. Nonetheless, "given the myriad of news groups and
news group providers, the burden of finding the proper provider and accessing its
(potentially incompatible) software may be prohibitive." Id. (citation omitted).
593. For a discussion of the "limited purpose public figure" doctrine, see supra note
548 and accompanying text.
594. See id. The Supreme Court has not provided a definition of "public contro-
versy." One court has noted that "[a] public controversy is not simply a matter of
interest to the public; it must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the
general public or some segment of it in an appreciable way." Foretich v. Capital Ct-
iesfABC, Inc., 37 F.3d, 1541 1554 (4th Cir. 1994); see also 1 Metcalf & Niehoff, supra
note 541, § 1.60 (discussing factors used in determining the existence of a public con-
troversy). At a minimum, the controversy must precede the publication of the alleg-
edly defamatory statement, Id.
595. Of course, many bulletin boards and newsgroups clearly do not discuss "public
controversies." One example of a newsgroup which arguably would not fall into this
category is "alt.barney dinosaur.die.die.die," which discusses the children's character
Barney the dinosaur. What's Out There." Newsgroups, Buff. News, Apr. 3,1995, at A6.
Another example might be a newsgroup or bulletin board about the O3. Simpson
trial, depending on whether the topic under discussion was Marcia Clark's hair or the
significance of the jury verdict to race relations in the United States.
1995]
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ments. Arguably, if only a few people participated in the discussion or
read the news story, there was no "public" controversy. Another
question which arises in this context is what satisfies the element of
"thrusting oneself to the forefront" necessary to qualify as a "limited
purpose public figure. 596 One could argue that it should depend on
the number and length of postings that the plaintiff made to the bulle-
tin board or forum in which the defamatory statement appeared.
The ease with which online information can be manipulated also
may indirectly impose certain duties on online service providers in
connection with retractions. The failure to publish a retraction is gen-
erally not considered evidence of actual malice.597 Other courts, how-
ever, have held that the refusal to issue a retraction could be evidence
of actual malice,598 and that a publisher's willingness to issue a retrac-
tion may show that the publisher did not act with constitutional malice
in publishing the original statement.599 Electronic technology makes
it easy to publish a retraction within hours, if not sooner, after learn-
ing of a potential claim. One could argue that the failure of an online
service provider to remove an allegedly defamatory statement from its
network, or at least to post a retraction immediately upon ascertaining
that the statement is false, indicates that the original statement was
published with actual malice.
Claims of online defamation also raise several procedural issues.
First, when does publication, which triggers the statute of limitations
in defamation cases,6° ° occur in the context of statements made on
information networks? An allegedly defamatory article included in a
database could be considered published either when it is first
uploaded on to the database or when it is downloaded by a subscriber.
Second, what is the existence and extent of personal jurisdiction
over distant online defamation defendants? Questions that arise in
this context include: (1) Can an online service provider be sued in any
jurisdiction into which its network reaches?;601 (2) If a newspaper
596. See supra note 548 and accompanying text.
597. See 1 Metcalf & Niehoff, supra note 541, § 1.70, at 1-157 to 1-158.
598. See Bandido's, Inc. v. Journal Gazette Co., 575 N.E.2d 324, 328 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991).
599. See Bryant v. Associated Press, 595 F. Supp. 814, 818 (D.V.I. 1984); Powell v.
Toledo Blade Co., No. 91-1550, 1991 WL 321960, at *3 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Sept. 18, 1991);
Cape Publications, Inc. v. Teri's Health Studio, Inc., 385 So.2d 188, 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980).
600. See 1 Metcalf & Niehoff, supra note 541, § 1.77, at 1-184.
601. A complaint filed in Florida in September 1994 by a Florida resident raises
these questions. The complaint alleges that The Kansas City Star published a defama-
tory article carried by Datatimes Corporation, an online service, and that a Prodigy
user republished the allegedly defamatory article in a message on a Prodigy service.
See And Another Libel Suit Against the Computer Bulletin Board, Libel Defense Re-
source Center Libel Letter, Dec. 1994, at 2, 2. The defendants named in this case
include The Kansas City Star and one of its reporters, Capital Cities/ABC (which
owns the Star), Datatimes, and Prodigy (which allegedly permitted the subscriber to
transmit the message which contained the alleged defamatory statements). Id.
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publishes an article in its hometown which is subsequently republished
by an online service, can the newspaper be sued in any location to
which the article is transmitted online?;6 2 and (3) Is an individual sub-
scriber who lives in state A subject to suit in state B because he
posted, from his home in state A, a message that allegedly defamed a
resident of state B?
The idea that an online subscriber is subject to suit in any location
through which his network connection travels is chilling because many
online network connections are circuitous and it is virtually impossible
to anticipate where a transmission might travel. Some connections
even temporarily exit the United States. Also chilling is the prospect
that material uploaded by user A in the United States could be
downloaded by user B without user A's knowledge and then
uploaded, also without user A's knowledge, to a network located in a
foreign country. At least theoretically, user A may find himself sub-
ject to suit thousands of miles away in a country that does not require
a showing of due process before allowing a court to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident.
Choice of law is also a concern in cases which arise from the use of
network technology. The case of United States v. Thomas6°3 raises this
issue even though it does not involve a defamation claim. In Thomas,
a Tennessee court convicted two California residents for the interstate
transportation of obscene images over their computer bulletin board
after a Tennessee postal inspector dialed into the bulletin board and
downloaded some of the images.60 Although a California court
might not have considered the images obscene, the Thomas court
found the material to be obscene according to the "community stan-
dards" of Tennessee. 5 The case is now being appealed, and nu-
merous organizations have submitted amicus briefs urging reversal on
the ground that the appropriate standard is that of California, where
the obscene material originated.
602. See id.
603. No. 94 CR 20019 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 25, 1994). For a thorough analysis of the
issues addressed in this case, see Pamela A. Huelster, Note, Cybersex and Community
Standards, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 865 (1995).
604. H-uelster, supra note 603, at 865-66.
605. Id.
606. Thomas v. United States, Nos. 94-6648 & 94-6639 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 1995); see
Multimedia Docket Sheet, Multimedia Strategist, July 1995, at 8, 8.
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